Information Sharing and Financial Sector Development in Africa by Tchamyou, Vanessa & Asongu, Simplice
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Information Sharing and Financial Sector
Development in Africa
Vanessa Tchamyou and Simplice Asongu
January 2016
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/74652/
MPRA Paper No. 74652, posted 19 October 2016 03:08 UTC
 1 
 
A G D I   Working Paper 
 
 
 
WP/16/023 
 
 
 
Information Sharing and Financial Sector Development in Africa 
  
 
Forthcoming: Journal of African Business      
 
Vanessa S. Tchamyou 
African Governance and Development Institute, 
P.O. Box 8413 Yaoundé, Cameroon. 
E-mail: simenvanessa@yahoo.com / simenvanessa@afridev.org   
 
 
Simplice A. Asongu 
African Governance and Development Institute  
P.O. Box 8413 Yaoundé, Cameroon. 
E-mail : asongusimplice@yahoo.com  / asongus@afridev.org   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2 
2016 African Governance and Development Institute                                                     WP/16/023 
 
 
AGDI Working Paper 
 
 
Research Department  
 
 
Information Sharing and Financial Sector Development in Africa 
 
 
Vanessa S. Tchamyou  & Simplice  A. Asongu  
 
January 2016 
  
Abstract 
 This study investigates the effect information sharing has on financial sector development 
in 53 African countries for the period 2004-2011. Information sharing is measured with private 
credit bureaus and public credit registries. Hitherto unexplored dimensions of financial sector 
development are employed, namely: financial sector dynamics of formalization, informalization 
and non-formalization. The empirical evidence is based on Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and 
Generalised Method of Moments (GMM). The following findings are established. Information 
sharing bureaus increase (reduce) formal (informal/non-formal) financial sector development. In 
order to ensure that information sharing bureaus improve (decrease) formal (informal/non-
formal) financial development, public credit registries should have between 45.45 and 50 percent 
coverage while private credit bureaus should have at least 26.25 percent coverage.   
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1. Introduction  
 There are at least two motives for investigating the relationship between information 
sharing and financial sector development in Africa: (i) introduction of hitherto unexplored 
notions of financial informalization, financial formalization and financial non-formalization in 
the financial sector development literature
1
 and (ii) gaps in the information asymmetry literature.  
 Recent literature accords with the view that access to finance in the continent has been 
constrained by issues of surplus liquidity (Saxegaard, 2006; Fouda, 2009; Asongu et al., 2016). It 
is in response to this policy syndrome that over the past twelve years, information sharing 
bureaus have been introduced to reduce concerns of moral hazard and adverse selection in the 
financial industry (see Triki & Gajigo, 2014). In essence, information sharing bureaus with 
instruments of private credit bureaus and public credit registries have been introduced to reduce 
information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders in order to ease constraints in access to 
finance
2
. Public credit registries and private credit bureaus are institutions that collect positive 
(e.g. repayment behaviour) and negative (e.g. default rates) information on borrowers’ 
obligations. The six distinctive features (in terms of access, data sources used, ownership, status, 
coverage and purpose) between public credit registries and private credit bureaus are discussed 
in the data section. As documented by Batuo and Kupukile (2010) and Allen et al. (2011), the 
policies motivating the initiation of information sharing bureaus have built on the evidence that 
lending by banks is limited by a number of factors that are indirectly or directly connected to the 
underlying information asymmetry, namely: eligibility to bank lending, physical access and 
affordability.  
 Information sharing bureaus are theoretically expected to serve as brokers in banking 
intermediation. Moreover, by sharing information, information sharing bureaus enable inter alia: 
efficient allocation of capital; reduce constraints in credit and increase interbank competition 
(see Jappelli & Pagano, 2002). This study is more concerned with the role of information sharing 
bureaus in financial sector development. Unfortunately, recent African literature on information 
                                                          
1
 Here we define ‘financial formalization’ as the propensity of the formal banking system to absorb money in 
circulation. It appreciates the degree at which the formal financial sector is developing to the detriment of informal 
and semi-formal sectors. Financial informalization is the rate at which the informal financial is developing at the 
expense of the formal and semi-formal financial sectors. Financial non-formalization appreciates the degree at 
which the informal and semi-formal financial sectors are progressing to the detriment of the formal financial sector. 
It is interesting to note that the non-formal financial sector includes the informal and semi-formal financial sectors.  
2
 In this study information sharing bureaus and ‘public credit registries and private credit bureaus’ are used 
interchangeably throughout. 
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asymmetry has concluded that information sharing  bureaus may not be stimulating inter-bank 
competition for enhanced credit access (Asongu et al., 2015). The authors have further 
emphasised that is it possible that instead of using information from information sharing bureaus 
to improve financial access, because of lack of competition, financial institutions have been 
using information sharing bureaus to enjoy a ‘quiet life’3.  
The literature on information asymmetry related to broad and African-specific studies has 
not engaged the dimension of financial sector development (Ivashina, 2009; Houston et al., 
2010; Tanjung et al., 2010). A reason for this missing link may be that data on information 
sharing bureaus is not available before 2004. Moreover, from the perspective of interbank 
competition, according to O’Toole (2014) and Asongu (2015a), a great chunk of studies has been 
limited to aspects of banking institutions like bank concentration and bank participation. We 
deviate from this stream of the literature by engaging financial sector development in the 
perspective of financialization. Accordingly, while a substantial bulk of studies has investigated 
the incidence of financial reforms on financial access (Arestis et al., 2002; Batuo & Kupukile, 
2010), this study presents a case for the imperative of introducing the previously missing 
informal financial sector into the conception and definition of the financial system on the one 
hand and the notion of financialization on the other hand.  
 By introducing the notion of financial sector financialization (which are proposed and 
discussed in Section 2), the inquiry unites two streams of research by simultaneously 
contributing to the macroeconomic literature on the measurement of financial development and 
responding to  an evolving field of economic development through informal finance and 
microfinance. Furthermore, the study suggests a practical way of disentangling the impact of 
information sharing on various financial sectors. Accordingly, the empirical exercise introduces 
hitherto unexplored concepts of financial sector non-formalization, informalization, semi-
formalization and formalization.  
 Consistent with Asongu et al. (2016), in spite of the acute concerns about financial access 
in Africa, the literature on information sharing has not given the continent the scholarly attention 
it deserves. According to the narrative, the limited scholarly focus on the continent has been 
                                                          
3
 ‘Quiet life’ denotes the Quiet Life Hypothesis. With regards to Coccorese and Pellecchia (2010), the Quiet Life 
Hypothesis is a an assumption that banks with substantial influence in the financial industry would use their 
advantages to grant less credit to borrowers and instead exploit such opportunities for a ‘quiet life’ or high profit 
margins.  
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restricted in scope because very limited and selected countries have been engaged.  Some studies 
have included: no African country (Galindo & Miller, 2001); four nations (Love & Mylenko, 
2003) and nine countries (Barth et al., 2009). Triki and Gajigo (2014) have focused on 42 nations 
for the period 2006-2009, while Asongu et al. (2015, 2016) have investigated 53 African nations 
for the period 2004-2011. The last-three studies which have employed public credit registries 
and private credit bureaus in the measurement of information sharing are closest to the present 
inquiry. Unfortunately, these studies have focused on financial access and not on financial sector 
development. Our extension is also motivated by recommendations for more research on the 
incidence of information sharing bureaus (Singh et al., 2009, p. 13).  
 In order to address the research gap, we use Ordinary Least Squares and the Generalised 
Method of Moments with data from 53 African countries for the period 2004-2011. The findings 
show that information sharing bureaus  increase (reduce) formal (informal/non-formal) financial 
sector development and increasing information  sharing bureaus leads to negative (positive) net 
effects on formal (informal/non-formal) financial sector development. We determine policy 
thresholds at which such counterintuitive effects can be avoided. The rest of the study is 
structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical underpinnings, propositions and related 
literature. The data and methodology are covered in Section 3. Empirical results and policy 
implications are presented in Section 4. Section 5 concludes and suggests future research 
directions.  
 
 
2. Background, theoretical underpinnings, propositions and related literature  
2.1 Background 
 Information sharing bureaus also known as ‘credit reference agencies’ refer to institutions 
that collect information on an individual or commercial borrowers’ obligations from multiple 
sources, namely: retails lenders, credit card companies and banks (for individuals) and supplies, 
direct investigation and public sources (for businesses). Upon data collection, the information is 
merged for a comprehensive credit report after cross-checking. The report can then be used by 
future creditors. Information  from a credit history report can entail both negative and positive 
information: (i) negative information (or information  on defaults for the most part) and (ii) 
positive information (consisting of details on all closed and opened credit amounts, closed credit 
accounts and repayment behaviour).  
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 Information sharing offices are crucial to the growth of credit in any economy because 
they overcome some asymmetries in information that restrict lenders from investigating risk 
profiles. On the one hand, information from credit histories ease concerns about adverse 
selection from the part of creditors because they enable good creditors to conclude collateral in 
reputation (in situations where complete information is taken into account). On the other hand, 
information sharing bureaus mitigate moral hazard by addressing the unappealing financial 
behaviour from borrowers, hence, consolidating repayment and default rates.  The resulting 
expansion of volume in lending is essentially important to underserved sectors such as medium, 
small and micro enterprises.  
 Consistent with Mylenko (2008), before 2008, information sharing bureaus were 
predominantly in a few countries in Latin America and the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development.  Fortunately, the advent of information and communication 
technology has dramatically increased the availability of information sharing bureaus in the 
Middle East and North Africa, Eastern Europe and Sub-Saharan Africa. 
 With the exception of South Africa, only a few countries in Sub-Saharan Africa had well 
functioning credit reporting offices before 2008. Some countries like Nigeria, Rwanda and 
Mozambique had established credit registries with the primary purpose of consolidating 
supervision at the banking sector. More emphasis was laid on substantial loans and owing to the 
absence of adequate incentives and technology, these credit registries often did not provide 
accurate and timely information. A couple of years prior to 2008, several initiatives were 
implemented across Africa in view of developing private credit bureaus because of requests for 
information by supervisors to enhance practices in risk management on the one hand and 
financial establishments on the other hand. In response, several countries initiated information 
sharing offices, namely: Zambia, Tanzania, Uganda, Ghana and Nigeria. As shown in Appendix 
1, whereas many countries now posses public credit registries, only few have private credit 
bureaus.  
2.2 Theoretical underpinnings and propositions  
 There are two dominants views on the theoretical nexus between the sharing of 
information and financial development (see Claus & Grimes, 2003). Whereas the first focuses on 
the transformation of bank assets’ risk features, the second is concerned with the mechanisms by 
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which liquidity provided by banks can be boosted. In addition, the two streams in the literature 
are in accordance with the perspective that the core mission of banks is to enhance financial 
access through reduction of cost and optimal channelling of financial resources from banks to 
economic operators. The highlighted streams are consistent with foremost literature on the 
importance of reducing information asymmetry for financial intermediary allocation efficiency, 
notably, on: ex-ante and ex-post information asymmetry (Diamond & Dybvig, 1983); 
communication by banks to investors on potential borrowers (Leland & Pyle, 1977); 
diversification with financial intermediaries (Diamond, 1984) and credit rationing models (Jaffee 
& Russell, 1976; Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981; Williamson, 1986).  
More contemporary literature suggests that information sharing bureaus are theoretically 
expected to boost financial access by improving financial sector development (Triki & Gajigo, 
2014; Asongu et al., 2015).  We measure financial sector development by addressing some 
shortcomings in the appreciation of financial development. In essence, the International 
Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics (IFS, 2008) definition of the financial system 
has failed to incorporate the informal financial sector (Asongu, 2014a).  
The propositions in Table 1 which incorporate the informal financial sector into the 
financial system definition are being increasingly employed in the financial sector development 
literature (see Asongu, 2015ab). Whereas Panel A shows indicators of financial sector based on 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP), the measurements of Panel B are linked to competition for 
shares in money supply in the financial sector. The financial sector development concept builds 
on the notions of informalization, formalization, non-formalization and semi-formalization. For 
example, financial informalization is the progress of the informal financial sector at the expense 
of the formal and semi-formal financial sectors whereas financial formalization is the growth of 
the formal financial sector to the detriment of the other financial sectors (semi-formal and 
informal). The concept of ‘financial sector development’ is based on shares in money supply. 
Within this framework, one financial sector improves to the detriment of other sectors by 
increasing the quantity of money supply circulating within its sector. It is interesting to note that 
the non-formal financial sector includes the informal and semi-formal financial sectors. 
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Table 1: Summary of propositions 
Panel A: GDP-based financial development indicators 
Propositions Name(s) Formula Elucidation 
Proposition  1 Formal  financial 
development  
Bank deposits/GDP Bank deposits
4
  here refer to demand, time 
and saving deposits in deposit money 
banks. 
Proposition  2 Semi-formal  
financial 
development 
(Financial deposits – 
Bank deposits)/ GDP 
Financial deposits
5
 are demand, time and 
saving deposits in deposit money banks 
and other financial institutions. 
Proposition  3 Informal  financial 
development 
(Money Supply – 
Financial deposits)/GDP 
 
 
Proposition  4 
Informal and semi-
formal financial 
development  
(Money  Supply –  Bank 
deposits)/GDP 
 
Panel B: Measures of financial sector importance
6
 
Proposition 5 Financial 
intermediary 
formalization 
Bank deposits/ Money 
Supply (M2) 
From ‘informal and semi-formal’ to formal 
financial development (formalization)
7
 . 
Proposition 6 Financial 
intermediary ‘semi-
formalization’ 
(Financial deposits - 
Bank deposits)/ Money 
Supply 
From ‘informal and formal’ to semi-formal 
financial development (Semi-
formalization)
8
. 
Proposition 7 Financial 
intermediary 
‘informalization’ 
(Money Supply – 
Financial deposits)/ 
Money Supply 
From ‘formal and semi-formal’ to informal 
financial development (Informalisation)
9
. 
Proposition 8 Financial 
intermediary ‘semi-
formalization and 
informalization’  
(Money Supply – Bank 
Deposits)/Money Supply  
Formal to ‘informal and semi-formal’ 
financial development: (Semi-
formalization and informalization) 
10
 
N.B: Propositions 5, 6, 7 add up to unity (one); arithmetically spelling-out the underlying assumption of sector 
importance. Hence, when their time series properties are considered in empirical analysis, the evolution of one 
sector is to the detriment of other sectors and vice-versa.  
Source: Asongu (2015a).   
 
                                                          
4
 Lines 24 and 25 of the International Financial Statistics (October 2008).  
5
 Lines 24, 25 and 45 of the International Financial Statistics (2008).  
6
 Given that money supply is influenced by a country’s central bank, a question might arise as to how money supply 
increased by the central bank affects the informal and non-formal financial sectors. In essence, money supply is used 
as a denominator, so if the central bank increases the supply of the national currency, it decreases the informal and 
non-formal financial sectors because the denominator increases.  
7
 “Accordingly, in undeveloped countries money supply is not equal to liquid liabilities or bank deposits. While in 
undeveloped countries bank deposits as a ratio of money supply is less than one, in developed countries this ratio is 
almost equal to 1.  This indicator appreciates the degree by which money in circulation is absorbed by the banking 
system.  Here we define ‘financial formalization’ as the propensity of the formal banking system to absorb money in 
circulation” (Asongu, 2015a, p. 432). 
8
 “This indicator measures the rate at which the semi-formal financial sector is evolving at the expense of formal 
and informal sectors” (Asongu, 2015a, p. 432). 
9
 “This proposition appreciates the degree by which the informal financial sector is developing to the detriment of 
formal and semi-formal sectors” (Asongu, 2015a, p. 432).  
10
 “The proposition measures the deterioration of the formal banking sector in the interest of other financial sectors 
(informal and semi-formal). From common sense, propositions 5 and 8 should be almost perfectly antagonistic, 
meaning the former (formal financial development at the cost of other financial sectors) and the latter (formal 
sector deterioration) should almost display a perfectly negative degree of substitution or correlation”  (Asongu, 
2015a, p. 432).  
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 Emphasis on the informal financial sector is important because of the substantially 
documented neglect of this sector in the financial development literature (Aryeetey, 2005; 
Adeusi et al., 2012; Meagher, 2013). The propositions challenge mainstream narrative in three 
key areas, namely: (i) disentanglement of the existing financial system definition into its semi 
formal and formal components; (ii) a definition of the financial system that incorporates the 
informal financial sector and (iii) introduction of the concept of financialization within the 
framework of financial sector development.  
 
2.3 Related literature  
In accordance with recent information sharing literature (Asongu et al., 2015, 2016), 
empirical studies have been oriented for the most part towards: the incidence of information 
sharing among creditors on the one hand and the effects of creditors’ rights on improved 
mechanisms of sharing information. In essence, one strand has been mainly concerned with the 
relevance of stronger creditors’ rights in: bankruptcy (Claessens & Klapper, 2005; Djankov et 
al., 2007; Brockman & Unlu, 2009) and risk-taking by banks (Houston et al., 2010; Acharya et 
al., 2011). The other strand is focused on investigating how mitigating asymmetric  information 
could inter alia:  boost financial access (Djankov et al., 2007; Brown et al., 2009; Asongu, 2015; 
Triki & Gajigo, 2014);  mitigate rates of defaults (Jappelli & Pagano, 2002); influence 
syndicated bank loans (Ivashina, 2009; Tanjung et al., 2010); reduce the cost of credit (Brown et 
al., 2009); influence corrupt-related lending (Barth et al., 2009) and affect antitrust intervention 
(Coccorese, 2012). 
Noticeably, the highlighted literature has been focused on developed and developing 
nations where concerns about surplus liquidity are not so severe, for the most part. In essence, 
while most of the literature has been oriented towards the Organisation of Economic Cooperation 
and Development countries and developing nations in Asia and Latin America, the African 
continent has not received the scholarly attentions it deserves because it comparatively has more 
severe concerns of financial access, due to information asymmetry (Asongu et al., 2015).  
 A macroeconomic perspective of the concern about information sharing has been 
engaged by Galindo and Miller (2001) who have concluded that compared to less developed 
nations, developed countries with information sharing bureaus are endowed with less restrictions 
to financial access. In essence, private credit registries that are performing contribute 
considerably to the decreasing sensitivity by corporations to decisions on investment for ‘cash 
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flows availability’ which is a proxy of financial constraint. The authors have also established that 
credit registries have experienced a 50% reduction in performance, notably: as concerns how 
investment decisions are sensitive to internal funds.  
 A combination of private and public credit registries and corporation-related data from 
the World Bank Business Environment Survey has been used by Love and Mylenko (2000) to 
investigate two principal issues, notably whether: owing to reduced  information asymmetry 
between perception managers and banks, credit registries are negatively associated with financial 
credit constraints. The authors conclude that whereas public credit registries do not significantly 
mitigate financial constraints, private credit bureaus are linked to higher financial access.  
 The role of information sharing bureaus in reducing information asymmetry on the one 
hand and borrower (and lender competition) on ‘lending corruption’ on the other hand, have 
been examined by Barth et al. (2009) to arrive at two main conclusions. First, lending-related 
corruption is reduced by interbank competition and reducing information asymmetry plays a 
fundamental role in the negative nexus. Second, ‘corrupt lending’ is also substantially affected 
by the legal environment, firm competition and the ownership structure of banks and firms.  
 Two main concerns related to information sharing and financial access have been 
investigated by Triki and Gajigo (2014), notably: the impact of information sharing bureaus on 
access to finance by firms and the effect of the design of private credit registries on constraints in 
financial access. Their findings show that: (i) access to finance is comparatively higher in 
countries which have private credit bureaus, relative to those with public credit registries or no 
information sharing bureaus and (ii) considerable cross-country differences are apparent in 
financial access and the design of information sharing bureaus with public credit registries.  
 Information sharing policy thresholds in financial development have been investigated by 
Asongu et al. (2015) to establish conflicting findings related to the effects of information sharing 
bureaus on financial development dynamics of depth, efficiency, activity and size. Asongu et al.  
(2016) have examined the effects of information sharing bureaus throughout the conditional 
distributions of financial development to conclude that existing levels of financial development 
are important in the materialisation of incremental rewards from information sharing bureaus.  
 As articulated in the introduction, this study complements the existing literature by 
engaging the missing dimensions of financial sector development and introducing hitherto 
unexplored concepts of financial formalization, informalization and non-formalization.  
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3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data  
 This paper investigates 53 African countries with data from African Development 
Indicators and the Financial Development and Structure Database of the World Bank for the 
period 2004-2011. Information sharing bureaus data is only available from 2004 while the end 
date of information from the Financial Development and Structure Database is 2011. The focus 
on Africa is consistent with the stylized facts in the motivation, notably: a stark contrast between 
severe constraints in financial access in the continent and scarce literature on the nexus between 
information sharing and financial development.  
  The propositions in Table 1 are computed from the Financial Development and Structure 
Database. In accordance with recent African information sharing literature (Triki & Gajigo, 
2014), information sharing is measured with public credit registries and private credit bureaus as 
percentage of adults covered. Six distinctive features between public credit registries and private 
credit bureaus are apparent, namely, in terms of access, data sources used, ownership, status, 
coverage and purpose. (1) Public credit bureaus access is restricted to information providers 
(open to all types of lenders). (2) Whereas information used by public credit registries is sourced 
from both bank and non-bank activities, that used by private credit bureaus also includes courts 
and tax authorities in addition to the sources of public credit registries. (3) Public credit registries 
belong to the government or central banks whereas private credit bureaus involve other 
independent parties and associations of lending. (4) Private credit bureaus are essentially profit-
making while public credit registries are not for profit. (4) While the coverage by public credit 
registries is provided for the most part on big enterprises and limited with respect to the nature 
data, private credit bureaus extend beyond big corporations to businesses with rich data and 
longer histories like small and medium size enterprises. (5) Whereas public credit registries 
embody public institutions that are founded with the principal goal of banking sector 
supervision, the creation of private credit bureaus is motivated by the need of and demand for 
borrowers’ information in the market.  
Three financial sector measurements are used namely:  formal financial development 
(Propositions 1 and 5); informal financial development (Propositions 3 and 7) and non-formal 
financial development (Propositions 4 and 8). Semi-formal financial development (Propositions 
2 and 6) is not employed because of constraints in degrees of freedom.  
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 Five control variables are used in order to account for variable omission bias, namely: 
foreign aid, public investment, trade, GDP growth and inflation. This choice of these variables is 
in accordance with the financial development literature (Huang, 2005; Osabuohein & Efobi, 
2013; Asongu, 2014b). After a pilot investigation, it is apparent that accounting for more than 
five control variables leads to the proliferation of instruments: the number of cross-sections is 
lower than the corresponding number of instruments in the Generalised Method of Moments 
specifications.  
 With regards to the expected signs, from a theoretical standpoint, development assistance 
is expected to increase financial development because it is anticipated to bridge the saving-
investment gap in less developed countries (Easterly, 2005). From a practical angle however, the 
underlying effect of foreign aid depends on the amount of aid that actually reaches the 
destination or recipient country. While a substantial bulk of the aid may be spent in donor 
countries, corrupt officials in recipient countries may siphon some and redeposit in tax havens 
that are under the jurisdictions of donor countries. The positive relationship between economic 
growth and financial development has been substantially documented in the literature (see   
Jaffee & Levonian 2001; Levine, 1997; Saint-Paul, 1992; Greenwood & Jovanovic, 1992). In 
essence, economic growth is linked to financial intermediation because of more interbank 
competition and increased availability of resources for productive investments. There is a 
positive relationship between investment and financial development (see Huang, 2011).  Both 
theoretical (Huybens & Smith, 1999) and empirical (Boyd et al., 2001) literature are consistent 
with the perspective that chaotic inflation is linked to less active and inefficient financial 
institutions.  Huang and Temple (2005) and Do and Levchenko (2004) have shown that trade 
openness positively affects financial development. It is important to also note that the engaged 
variables in the conditioning information set may affect the formal and informal financial sectors 
differently.  
 The definition of variables is provided in Appendix 2, Appendix 3 presents the summary 
statistics while Appendix 4 discloses the correlation matrix.  It is apparent from Appendix 3 that 
the indicators are quite comparable from mean values. Furthermore, from corresponding 
standard deviations, reasonable estimated linkages can emerge. The purpose of Appendix 4 is to 
control for potential concerns of multicollinearity. From a preliminary assessment, the concerns 
are apparent between financial sector development variables. Fortunately, such concerns are not 
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of relevant nature because the financial sector development variables are employed exclusively 
as dependent variables in distinct specifications.  
 
3.2 Methodology  
3.2.1 Baseline specification 
The Ordinary Least Squares specification is as follows in Eq. (1) 
tiih
h
j
j
titititi WInterPCBPCRFSD ,,
5
1
5
1
,3,2,10,   

     (1) 
 
Where: tiFSD ,  
 is the financial sector development (financial formalization, informalization and 
non-formalization) of country i
 
at  period t ; is a constant;
 
PCR , Public Credit Registries; 
PCB , Private Credit Bureaus; Inter , interaction between either PCR ( PCRPCR ) or PCB  
( PCBPCB );
 
W  is the vector of five control variables  (inflation, public investment, GDP 
growth, trade and foreign aid),
 
and ti ,  the error term. The specification is robust to 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors. 
 
 
3.2.2Robustness Specification  
 The study adopts the Generalised Method of Moments with forward orthogonal 
deviations as empirical strategy for robustness check. The specification is the Roodman (2009ab) 
extension of Arellano and Bover (1995) which has been documented to limit instrument 
proliferation and control for cross sectional dependence (see Love &  Zicchino, 2006; Baltagi, 
2008). The two primary conditions for the implementation of the Generalised Method of 
Moments technique are satisfied because: (i) the financial sector development dependent 
variables are persistent, given that their correlations with corresponding lags are higher than the 
rule of thumb threshold of 0.800 (see Appendix 5) and (ii) the number of time series (T=8) is less 
than the number of cross sections (N=53). Hence, N>T.  
 
The following equations in levels (2) and first difference (3) summarize the estimation 
procedure.  
 tititih
h
j
j
tititititi WInterPCBPCRFSDFSD ,,,
5
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5
1
,4,3,2,10,    

              (2)     
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Where: tiFSD ,  
 is the financial sector development (financial formalization, informalization and 
non-formalization) of country i
 
at  period t ; is a constant;
 
 represents tau ;  PCR , Public 
Credit Registries; PCB , Private Credit Bureaus; Inter , interaction between either PCR 
( PCRPCR ) or PCB  ( PCBPCB );
 
W  is the vector of five control variables  (inflation, public 
investment, GDP growth, trade and foreign aid),
 i

 
is the country-specific effect, t  
is the time-
specific constant  and ti ,  the error term. In the specification, a  two-step instead of a  one-step 
procedure is adopted because it controls for heteroscedasticity.  In accordance with Brambor et 
al. (2006) on the pitfalls in interactive regressions: (i) all constitutive terms are included in the 
specifications and (ii) the effect of the modifying variables (or information sharing bureaus) is 
interpreted as a conditional marginal effect.  
 
3.2.3 Identification and exclusion restrictions  
 In accordance with recent literature (Dewan & Ramaprasad, 2014; Asongu & De Moor, 
2016), all independent indicators are predetermined or suspected endogenous variables. Hence, 
while the gmmstyle is adopted for the predetermined variables, only years are treated as strictly 
exogenous and the method for treating the ivstyle (years) is ‘iv(years, eq(diff))’ because it is 
highly unfeasible for the years to become endogenous in first-difference (see Roodman, 2009b). 
 In order to address the issue of simultaneity, lagged regressors are used as instruments for 
forward-differenced indicators. In essence, in order to remove fixed effects that are susceptible 
of influencing the assessed relationships, Helmet transformations are performed for the 
regressors (see Asongu & De Moor, 2016). These transformations embody forward mean-
differencing of the indicators: the mean of future observations is subtracted from the variables 
instead of subtracting the previous observations for the contemporaneous one (Roodman, 2009b, 
p. 104). These transformations ensure parallel or orthogonal conditions between forward-
differenced variables and lagged values. Irrespective of the number of lags, in order to minimise 
the loss of data, with the exception of the last observation for each country, the underlying 
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transformations are computable for all observations.  “And because lagged observations do not 
enter the formula, they are valid as instruments” (Roodman (2009b, p. 104). 
 The study further argues that the years (also used as instruments) that are treated as 
strictly exogenous, influence the outcome indicator only through the endogenous explaining 
variables. The statistical relevance underlying this exclusion restriction is investigated with the 
Difference in Hansen Test for instrument exogeneity.  Accordingly, the alternative hypothesis of 
the test should be rejected for the instruments to elucidate the dependent variable exclusively via 
the endogenous explaining variables.  
 It is important to note that in a standard instrumental variable procedure, rejecting the 
alternative hypothesis of the Sargan Overidentifying Restrictions test reveals that the instruments 
explain the outcome variable exclusively through investigated channels or explaining variables. 
Whereas this information criterion has been employed in the literature using an instrumental 
variable estimation technique (see Beck et al., 2003; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016), in the 
Generalised Method of Moments procedure (with forward orthogonal deviations) the Difference 
in Hansen Test is employed to investigate whether  years exhibit strict exogeneity by explaining 
financial sector development exclusively through the proposed mechanisms (or endogenous 
explaining variables). Therefore, in the reported findings, we confirm the validity of the 
exclusion restriction test when the alternative hypothesis of Difference in Hansen Test related to 
instrumental variable (year, eq(diff)) is rejected.  
 
4. Empirical results 
4.1 Baseline results with Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
 Table 2 and Table 3 present baseline Ordinary Least Squares findings. While Table 2 
presents findings related to formal financial development, the results of informal (Panel A) and 
non-formal (Panel B) financial development are presented in Table 3. The findings are discussed 
in two levels, notably: (i) effects without interactions and (ii) impacts with interactions where 
marginal and unconditional effects are discussed. For instance, in the second-to-the last column 
of Table 2, the marginal effect of public credit registries on financial formalization is 0.0001 
whereas the unconditional impact of public credit registries is -0.005. The corresponding net 
effect from increasing public credit registries is -0.004 ([2.155×0.0001] + [-0.005])
11
.  
                                                          
11
 2.155 is the mean value of public credit registries.  
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 The following findings are established from the baseline findings. Both information 
sharing bureaus  increase (reduce) formal (informal/non-formal) financial sector development 
and increasing public credit registries leads to negative (positive) net effects on formal 
(informal/non-formal) financial sector development. The control variables are significant with 
the expected signs.  
 
Table 2: Financial Formalization and Information Sharing   
       
 Formal Financial Development  
       
 Formal Financial Development (Prop.1) Financial Dev. Formalization (Prop. 5) 
 Baseline PCR PCB Baseline PCR PCB 
Constant  25.451*** 31.850*** 28.109*** 0.657*** 0.779*** 0.683*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Public Credit Registries (PCR) 1.419*** 0.728 --- 0.004*** -0.005** --- 
 (0.000) (0.171)  (0.000) (0.048)  
Private Credit Bureaus (PCB) 0.429*** --- 0.446 0.006*** --- 0.006*** 
 (0.000)  (0.326) (0.000)  (0.001) 
PCR*PCR --- 0.013 --- --- 0.0001*** --- 
  (0.216)   (0.003)  
PCB*PCB --- --- -0.002 --- --- 0.000 
   (0.725)   (0.807) 
GDP growth  -0.251 -0.362 -0.367 0.002 0.0001 0.001 
 (0.223) (0.136) (0.132) (0.428) (0.957) (0.521) 
Inflation -0.024* -0.047*** -0.058*** 0.0004*** 0.0001 0.0003** 
 (0.089) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.520) (0.012) 
Public Investment  0.270 0.316 0.331 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 
 (0.270) (0.275) (0.277) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Foreign Aid  -0.383** -0.686*** -0.594*** -0.0004 -0.005*** -0.001 
 (0.011) (0.000) (0.000) (0.638) (0.000) (0.234) 
Trade  -0.015 -0.009 0.036 -0.000 0.00007 0.0001 
 (0.631) (0.766) (0.357) (0.995) (0.804) (0.487) 
Net Effect of ISB na na na na -0.004 na 
       
Adjusted R² 0.330 0.235 0.162 0.438 0.096 0.407 
Fisher 30.74*** 20.94*** 19.04*** 22.42*** 6.23*** 19.05*** 
Observations  293 295 296 293 295 296 
       
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. GDP: Gross Domestic Product. ISB: Information Sharing Bureaus.   Dev: 
Development. na: net effects cannot be computed because of the insignificance of marginal effects and/or unconditional effects. 
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Table 3: Financial Informalization/Nonformalization and Information Sharing   
       
 Panel A: Informal Financial Development  
       
 Informal Financial Dev. (Prop.3) Financial Dev. Informalization (Prop. 7) 
 Baseline PCR PCB Baseline PCR PCB 
Constant  8.803*** 5.576*** 8.779*** 0.319*** 0.215*** 0.311*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Public Credit Registries (PCR) 0.023 0.496*** --- -0.004*** 0.005** --- 
 (0.440) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.040)  
Private Credit Bureaus (PCB) -0.214*** --- 0.045 -0.006*** --- -0.005*** 
 (0.000)  (0.656) (0.000)  (0.001) 
PCR*PCR --- -0.010*** --- --- -0.0002*** --- 
  (0.000)   (0.003)  
PCB*PCB --- --- -0.004** --- --- -0.00001 
   (0.015)   (0.766) 
Control Variables   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Net Effect of ISB na 0.474 na na 0.004 na 
       
Adjusted R² 0.355 0.080 0.376 0.422 0.090 0.392 
Fisher 24.18*** 26.00*** 31.98*** 21.25*** 7.25*** 19.16*** 
Observations 308 310 311 293 295 296 
       
       
 Panel B: Non-formal Financial Development 
 Non-formal Financial Dev. (Prop.4) Financial Dev. Non-formalization (Prop. 8) 
 Baseline PCR PCB Baseline PCR PCB 
Constant  9.349*** 6.085*** 9.317*** 0.324*** 0.220*** 0.316*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Public Credit Registries (PCR) 0.020 0.500*** --- -0.004*** 0.005** --- 
 (0.521) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.048)  
Private Credit Bureaus (PCB) -0.220*** --- 0.033 -0.006*** --- -0.006*** 
 (0.000)  (0.746) (0.000)  (0.001) 
PCR*PCR --- -0.011*** --- --- -0.0001*** --- 
  (0.000)   (0.003)  
PCB*PCB --- --- -0.004** --- --- -0.000 
   (0.018)   (0.807) 
       
Control Variables   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Net Effect of ISB na 0.476 na na 0.004 na 
       
Adjusted R² 0.368 0.080 0.388 0.438 0.096 0.407 
Fisher 27.00*** 30.20*** 27.11*** 22.42*** 6.23*** 19.05*** 
Observations 308 310 311 293 295 296 
       
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. GDP: Gross Domestic Product. ISB: Information Sharing Bureaus. Dev: 
Development.   na: net effects cannot be computed because of the insignificance of marginal effects and/or unconditional effects.  
 
 
4. 2 Robustness checks with Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) 
 Table 4, Table 5 and Table 6 respectively present robust findings with GMM 
corresponding to formal, informal and non-formal financial developments. Consistent with the 
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baseline findings, the tables are presented in two categories: the left-hand-side shows results 
related to GDP-based indicators while the right-hand-side presents findings linked to ‘money 
supply’-oriented measurements of financialization. Four post-estimation diagnostic tests are used 
to assess the validity of models (Asongu & De Moor, 2016)
12
.  
 The findings are discussed in two levels, notably with regards to: (i) effects without 
interactions and (ii) impacts with interactions where marginal and unconditional effects are 
discussed. The net effects are computed with the marginal and unconditional effects. For 
example, in the last column corresponding to Table 5, the marginal effect of private credit 
bureaus on financial informalization is -0.00001 while the unconditional impact of private credit 
bureaus is 0.0007. The corresponding net effect of private credit bureaus is 0.0006 ([4.223×-
0.00001] + 0.0007)
13
.  
The following findings are established from Table 4 on linkages between financial 
formalization and information sharing bureaus. First, valid inferences cannot be derived from the 
right-hand-side of Table 4 because at the 1% significance level, there is post-estimation presence 
of autocorrelation in the residuals. Second, public credit registries negatively affect formal 
financial development. Third, increasing public credit registries has a negative marginal effect on 
formal financial development. Hence, the corresponding net effect is negative. Fourth, the 
significant control variables have expected signs for the most part.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
12
 “First, the null hypothesis of the second-order Arellano and Bond autocorrelation test (AR(2)) in difference for 
the absence of autocorrelation in the residuals should not be rejected. Second the Sargan and Hansen 
overidentification restrictions (OIR) tests should not be significant because their null hypotheses are the positions 
that instruments are valid or not correlated with the error terms. In essence, while the Sargan OIR test is not robust 
but not weakened by instruments, the Hansen OIR is robust but weakened by instruments. In order to restrict 
identification or limit the proliferation of instruments, we have ensured that instruments are lower than the number 
of cross-sections in most specifications. Third, the Difference in Hansen Test (DHT) for exogeneity of instruments 
isalso employed to assess the validity of results from the Hansen OIR test. Fourth, a Fischer test for the joint validity 
of estimated coefficients is also provided” (Asongu & De Moor, 2016, p.9). 
13
 4.223 is the mean value of private credit bureaus.  
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Table 4: Financial Formalization and Information Sharing   
       
 Formal Financial Development  
       
 Formal Financial Development (Prop.1) Financial Dev. Formalization (Prop. 5) 
 Baseline PCR PCB Baseline PCR PCB 
Constant  -3.178* -5.012** -3.334** 0.040 0.028 0.017 
 (0.077) (0.014) (0.014) (0.189) (0.296) (0.588) 
Prop.1 (-1) 1.075*** 1.097*** 1.036*** --- --- --- 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
Prop.2  (-1) --- --- --- 0.949*** 0.974*** 0.966*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Public Credit Registries (PCR) -0.183*** -0.128*** --- 0.0003* -0.00005 --- 
 (0.000) (0.001)  (0.087) (0.912)  
Private Credit Bureaus (PCB) -0.041 --- -0.040 0.0003 --- -0.00001 
 (0.123)  (0.226) (0.121)  (0.956) 
PCR*PCR --- -0.001*** --- --- -0.000 --- 
  (0.006)   (0.438)  
PCB*PCB --- --- 0.0008 --- --- 0.000002 
   (0.179)   (0.579) 
GDP growth  -0.059* -0.077** -0.080*** 0.0008*** 0.0008*** 0.001*** 
 (0.065) (0.038) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.000) 
Inflation -0.003 -0.008 -0.004 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.00008 
 (0.704) (0.410) (0.599) (0.415) (0.342) (0.661) 
Public Investment  -0.021 0.075** 0.022 0.0006 0.0001 0.00004 
 (0.559) (0.011) (0.523) (0.168) (0.673) (0.904) 
Foreign Aid  0.060 0.083* 0.066 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.178) (0.084) (0.103) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Trade  0.036* 0.035* 0.033*** -0.0001* -0.0001** -0.000001 
 (0.067) (0.099) (0.001) (0.086) (0.044) (0.993) 
       
Net Effects of ISB na -0.130 na na na na 
       
AR(1) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.484) (0.563) (0.690) 
AR(2) (0.611) (0.556) (0.292) (0.046) (0.043) (0.031) 
Sargan OIR (0.010) (0.023) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.013) 
Hansen OIR (0.326) (0.147) (0.388) (0.546) (0.397) (0.546) 
       
DHT for instruments       
(a)Instruments in levels       
H excluding group (0.294) (0.230) (0.088) (0.270) (0.474) (0.122) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.385) (0.189) (0.765) (0.692) (0.349) (0.867) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))       
H excluding group (0.204) (0.274) (0.239) (0.413) (0.285) (0.446) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.672) (0.124) (0.725) (0.676) (0.624) (0.603) 
       
Fisher  3038.79*** 15360.4*** 13841.2*** 1938.02*** 1369.84*** 40870.6*** 
Instruments  37 37 37 37 37 37 
Countries  45 45 45 45 45 45 
Observations  258 260 260 258 260 260 
       
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. Dif: 
Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients, 
Hausman test and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; b) 
the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. GDP: Gross Domestic Product. ISB: Information Sharing Bureaus na: net effects cannot be 
computed because of the insignificance of marginal effects and/or unconditional effects.  
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Table 5: Financial Informalization and Information Sharing 
       
 Informal Financial Development  
       
 Informal Financial Dev. (Prop.3) Financial Dev. Informalization (Prop. 7) 
 Baseline PCR PCB Baseline PCR PCB 
Constant  -2.256*** -2.265*** 0.041 -0.014 -0.006 -0.006 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.943) (0.252) (0.539) (0.513) 
Prop.3 (-1) 1.059*** 1.108*** 0.985*** --- --- --- 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
Prop.7  (-1) --- --- --- 0.989*** 0.972*** 1.003*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Public Credit Registries (PCR) -0.046*** -0.042** --- -0.0004** -0.0003 --- 
 (0.000) (0.032)  (0.046) (0.302)  
Private Credit Bureaus (PCB) -0.001 --- 0.021* -0.0001 --- 0.0007** 
 (0.905)  (0.072) (0.413)  (0.010) 
PCR*PCR --- 0.0002 --- --- -0.000 --- 
  (0.477)   (0.936)  
PCB*PCB --- --- -0.0008*** --- --- -0.00001*** 
   (0.004)   (0.001) 
GDP growth  -0.055*** -0.059*** -0.037** -0.00007 -0.0003 -0.0004 
 (0.005) (0.000) (0.022) (0.792) (0.292) (0.116) 
Inflation -0.000 0.000 0.000002 0.0004** 0.0002 0.0002 
 (0.502) (0.521) (0.759) (0.023) (0.284) (0.237) 
Public Investment  -0.064*** -0.043** -0.042* -0.001** -0.0006* -0.0003 
 (0.005) (0.031) (0.062) (0.020) (0.056) (0.252) 
Foreign Aid  0.014 0.019 -0.035* -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.546) (0.420) (0.056) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Trade  0.037*** 0.030*** 0.013* 0.0003*** 0.0002** 0.0001* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.078) (0.009) (0.014) (0.068) 
       
Net Effects of ISB na na 0.017 na na 0.0006 
       
AR(1) (0.024) (0.024) (0.016) (0.484) (0.552) (0.883) 
AR(2) (0.188) (0.168) (0.243) (0.069) (0.071) (0.048) 
Sargan OIR (0.709) (0.824) (0.328) (0.034) (0.023) (0.168) 
Hansen OIR (0.543) (0.811) (0.692) (0.362) (0.345) (0.640) 
       
DHT for instruments       
(a)Instruments in levels       
H excluding group (0.532) (0.664) (0.638) (0.640) (0.710) (0.472) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.482) (0.744) (0.598) (0.235) (0.194) (0.642) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))       
H excluding group (0.411) (0.710) (0.574) (0.311) (0.240) (0.444) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.672) (0.729) (0.691) (0.482) (0.614) (0.814) 
       
Fisher  1484.73*** 5227.53*** 27847.1*** 3093.32*** 1091.63*** 11136.1*** 
Instruments  37 37 37 37 37 37 
Countries  45 45 45 45 45 45 
Observations  275 277 277 258 260 260 
       
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. Dif: 
Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients, 
Hausman test and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; b) 
the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. GDP: Gross Domestic Product. ISB: Information Sharing Bureaus.   Dev: Development.  
na: net effects cannot be computed because of the insignificance of marginal effects and/or unconditional effects. 
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Table 6: Financial Non-formalization and Information Sharing 
       
 Non-formal Financial Development  
       
 Non-formal Financial Dev. (Prop.4) Financial Dev. Non-formalization (Prop. 8) 
 Baseline PCR PCB Baseline PCR PCB 
Constant  -2.594*** -2.680*** -0.287 -0.002 -0.009 -0.012 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.584) (0.851) (0.387) (0.279) 
Prop.4 (-1) 1.037*** 1.089*** 0.973*** --- --- --- 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
Prop.8 (-1) --- --- --- 0.998*** 0.988*** 1.012*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Public Credit Registries (PCR) -0.040*** -0.032 --- -0.0001 -0.0003 --- 
 (0.000) (0.169)  (0.352) (0.460)  
Private Credit Bureaus (PCB) 0.004 --- 0.018 -0.00009 --- 0.0009*** 
 (0.664)  (0.135) (0.704)  (0.001) 
PCR*PCR --- 0.0001 --- --- 0.000001 --- 
  (0.799)   (0.838)  
PCB*PCB --- --- -0.0006** --- --- -0.00001*** 
   (0.013)   (0.000) 
GDP growth  -0.074*** -0.077*** -0.056*** -0.0008*** -0.0008*** -0.0006* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.009) (0.002) (0.064) 
Inflation 0.00001 0.00002** 0.00002** 0.0003* 0.0002 0.0002 
 (0.285) (0.013) (0.015) (0.076) (0.195) (0.207) 
Public Investment  -0.043* -0.022 -0.023 -0.0007 -0.0003 -0.0006 
 (0.068) (0.292) (0.315) (0.189) (0.273) (0.146) 
Foreign Aid  0.023 0.033 -0.022 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.352) (0.198) (0.177) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Trade  0.040*** 0.033*** 0.015** 0.0001 0.0002** 0.0002* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.021) (0.189) (0.026) (0.060) 
       
Net Effects of ISB na na na na na 0.00004 
       
AR(1) (0.019) (0.021) (0.012) (0.438) (0.484) (0.733) 
AR(2) (0.204) (0.204) (0.243) (0.048) (0.043) (0.030) 
Sargan OIR (0.457) (0.582) (0.217) (0.015) (0.006) (0.071) 
Hansen OIR (0.444) (0.669) (0.632) (0.357) (0.234) (0.545) 
       
DHT for instruments       
(a)Instruments in levels       
H excluding group (0.242) (0.387) (0.410) (0.375) (0.561) (0.157) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.593) (0.739) (0.677) (0.364) (0.150) (0.818) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))       
H excluding group (0.316) (0.651) (0.448) (0.256) (0.147) (0.292) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.660) (0.739) (0.791) (0.600) (0.605) (0.914) 
       
Fisher  2442.05*** 6450.46*** 25789.4*** 898.81*** 3066.06*** 12722.4*** 
Instruments  37 37 37 37 37 37 
Countries  45 45 45 45 45 45 
Observations  275 277 277 258 260 260 
       
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. Dif: 
Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients, 
Hausman test and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; b) 
the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. GDP: Gross Domestic Product. ISB: Information Sharing Bureaus.  Dev: Development.  
na: net effects cannot be computed because of the insignificance of marginal effects and/or unconditional effects. 
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From Table 5 on nexuses between financial informalization and information sharing, the 
following findings are apparent. First, non valid inferences can be derived from the right-hand-
side because at the 1% significance level, there is post-estimation presence of autocorrelation in 
the residuals. Second, public credit registries have a negative impact on informal financial 
development. Third, the net effect of private credit bureaus is positive, albeit with negative 
marginal effects and positive unconditional impacts. Fourth, on the control variables, the 
negative signs of GDP growth and public investment are consistent with intuition. Public 
investment is channelled through formal banking institutions for the most part. The two decades 
of growth resurgence in Africa have been characterised by exclusive development. This is the 
reason an April 2015 World Bank report has revealed that from the 1990s poverty has been 
decreasing in all regions of the world with the exception of Africa (World Bank, 2015).  The 
findings of Table 6 on non-formal financial development are broadly consistent with those of 
Table 5 with the exception that the unconditional positive effect of private credit bureaus is not 
significant
14
. 
 
4.2 Further discussion and policy implications 
 Comparing and contrasting the findings from Ordinary Least Squares and Generalised 
Method of Moments yields the following conclusions. Information sharing bureaus  increase 
(reduce) formal (informal/non-formal) financial sector development and increasing information  
sharing offices leads to negative(positive) net effects on formal (informal/non-formal) financial 
sector development. Whereas the first strand of the findings is broadly consistent with theoretical 
underpinnings and intuition for introducing information sharing offices, the second strand on 
decreasing marginal effects is an indication that increasing information sharing offices beyond a 
specific threshold leads to undesired effects or impacts that are not consistent with theoretical 
underpinnings. In the paragraphs that follow, we first discuss implications for the first strand of 
the findings, then implications for the second strand.  
 In the first strand, findings from non-interactive specifications are consistent with 
theoretical underpinnings because, information sharing bureaus are primarily designed to 
increase financial access in the formal financial sector and discourage financial access in the 
                                                          
14
 It is important to note that there is a high degree of substitution between informal and non-formal financial 
development as a result of concerns in the degrees of freedom in semi-formal financial development. 
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informal/non-formal financial sectors. From the formal financial development perspective, 
information sharing bureaus reduce information asymmetry notably: by mitigating adverse 
selection on the part of lenders and moral hazard on the part of borrowers. From the informal 
financial development angle, information sharing bureaus also act as disciplining devices by 
discouraging borrowers from defaulting on their debts because they think they can rely on the 
informal and non-formal financial sectors as viable and sustainable alternatives to the formal 
financial sector.  
 In the second strand of the findings, we have observed that increasing information 
sharing office leads to undesired effects. In other words, we have broadly established that: (i) in 
Ordinary Least Squares, increasing public credit registries leads to negative (positive) net effects 
on formal (informal/non-formal) financial sector development and (ii) in Generalised Methods of 
Moments, increasing public credit registries leads to negative net effects on formal financial 
development while increasing private credit bureaus leads to positive net impacts on informal 
financial development.  It follows that increasing information sharing offices beyond certain 
levels lead to counterintuitive findings. We determine policy thresholds at which such 
counterintuitive results can be avoided. This is done at three-stages, namely: clarification of the 
notion of threshold, calculation of thresholds and threshold implications. 
 The notion of threshold is in accordance with Cummins (2000) on a certain level in 
language proficiency before second-language speakers can begin enjoying the advantages from a 
given language. In addition, the conception of threshold is also consistent with the theory of 
critical mass that has been considerably documented in the economic development literature (see 
Roller & Waverman, 2001; Ashraf & Galor, 2013). A very recent application of the threshold or 
critical mass theory from interaction empirical specifications can be found in Batuo (2015). In 
essence, in this narrative, the notion of threshold is not different from: (i) critical mass for 
positive impacts (Roller & Waverman, 2001; Batuo, 2015); (ii) minimum requirement for 
enjoying of positive impacts (Cummins, 2000) and (iii) conditions for Kuznets and U shapes 
(Ashraf & Galor, 2013).  
In the light of the above discussion, a negative (positive) threshold of an information 
sharing bureau is the level of the information sharing bureau at which an initial or unconditional 
positive (negative) effect becomes negative (positive). Two scenarios are apparent from our 
findings. On the one hand, on informal/non-formal financial development, a negative threshold is 
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the point at which the positive effect of an information sharing bureaus on informal/non-formal 
financial development becomes negative. On the other hand, on formal financial development, a 
positive threshold is the point at which the negative effect of an information sharing bureau on 
formal financial development changes from negative to positive. Hence, these are thresholds of 
information sharing offices for which the desired effects of increasing (reducing) formal 
(informal/non-formal) financial development can be achieved. Moreover, for the computed 
thresholds to make economic sense or have economic meaning, they should be within the 
minimum and maximum ranges disclosed by the summary statistics.  
             From the baseline findings: (i) the positive threshold of public credit registries in 
financial development formalization is 50 (0.005/0.0001) percent coverage (Table 2); (ii) the 
negative threshold of public credit registries is 49.6 (0.496/0.010) percent coverage in informal 
financial development and 25 (0.005/0.0002) percent coverage in financial development 
informalization and (iii) the negative threshold of public credit registries is 45.45 (0.500/0.011) 
in non-formal financial development and 50 (0.005/0.0001) percent coverage in financial 
development non-formalization (Table 3). The thresholds are within range for the most part 
because they are between 0.000 percent coverage (minimum) to 49.8 percent coverage 
(maximum) for public credit registries. From the robust findings: the negative threshold of 
private credit bureaus is 26.25 (0.0.21/0.0008) percent coverage in informal financial 
development (Table 5). The private credit bureaus threshold is also within range. It follows that 
in order to ensure that information sharing bureaus improve (decrease) formal (informal/non-
formal) financial development, public credit registries should have between 45.45 and 50 percent 
coverage while private credit bureaus should have at least 26.25 percent coverage.  This would 
go a long way to contribute towards addressing the substantially documented concerns of 
financial access in the African business literature (see Biekpe, 2004; Bartels et al., 2009; Tuomi, 
2011; Darley, 2012; Asongu, 2012, 2013).  
 
 
5. Conclusion and future research directions  
 
This study has investigated the effect information sharing has on financial sector development in 
53 African countries for the period 2004-2011. Information sharing is measured with private 
credit bureaus and public credit registries. Hitherto unexplored dimensions of financial sector 
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development are employed, namely: financial sector dynamics of formalization, informalization 
and non-formalization. The empirical evidence is based on Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and 
Generalised Method of Moments (GMM). The following findings are established. Information 
sharing bureaus  increase (reduce) formal (informal/non-formal) financial sector development 
and increasing information  sharing bureaus leads to negative (positive) net effects on formal 
(informal/non-formal) financial sector development. The latter results are apparent in OLS from 
public credit registries and GMM from: (i) private credit bureaus in informal/non-formal 
financial development and (ii) public credit registries for formal financial development. We have 
determined policy thresholds at which counterintuitive effects can be avoided. In order to ensure 
that information sharing bureaus improve (decrease) formal (informal/non-formal) financial 
development, public credit registries should have between 45.45 and 50 percent coverage while 
private credit bureaus should have at least 26.25 percent coverage.   
 By introducing the concept of financial sector development, the study has united two 
streams of research by simultaneously contributing to the macroeconomic literature on the 
measurement of financial development and responding to an evolving field of economic 
development through informal finance and microfinance. Furthermore, the study has suggested a 
practical means of disentangling the impact of information sharing on various financial sectors.  
 The findings can be extended by assessing the established linkages throughout the 
conditional distribution of financial sector development. The intuition for this future research 
direction is that the role of information sharing on financial sector development may be 
contingent on the level of financial sector development, such that differing impacts are apparent 
in countries with low, intermediate and high levels of financial sector development.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Country-specific average PCR, PCB and financial propositions  
       
 Information sharing Propositions 
 PCR PCB Prop.1 Prop.3 Prop.5 Prop.7 
       
1) Algeria 0.216 0 .000 41.148 9.269 0.820 0.179 
2) Angola 2.412 0.000 18.7486 2.148 0.882 0.117 
3) Benin 8.037 0.000 21.937 9.841 0.688 0.311 
4) Botswana 0 .000 48.150 37.694 1.747 0.952 0.047 
5) Burkina Faso 1.750 0.000 18.340 6.235 0.741 0.258 
6) Burundi 0.212 0.000 18.463 4.624 0.806 0.193 
7) Cameroon 2.312 0.000 15.215 3.816 0.798 0.201 
8) Cape Verde 17.042 0.000 72.242 7.190 0.909 0.090 
9) Central African Republic  1.412 0.000 6.304 9.268 0.403 0.596 
10) Chad 0.400 0.000 4.727 6.744 0.409 0.590 
11) Comoros 0.000 0.000 18.489 4.548 0.749 0.191 
12) Congo Democratic Republic 0.000 0.000 5.066 2.378 na na 
13) Congo Republic 3.400 0.000 10.682 7.555 0.571 0.428 
14) Côte d’Ivoire  2.487 0.000 17.962 10.656 0.629 0.370 
15) Djibouti 0.200 0.000 65.312 7.539 na na 
16) Egypt 2.062 5.271 73.307 9.701 0.859 0.115 
17) Equatorial Guinea 2.566 0.000 7.3484 1.706 0.807 0.192 
18) Eritrea 0.000 0.000 na 0 na na 
19) Ethiopia  0.087 0.000 30.850 5.135 na na 
20) Gabon 12.716 0.000 14.309 3.812 0.788 0.211 
21) The Gambia 0.000 0.000 30.796 7.962 0.791 0.208 
22) Ghana 0.000 1.700 18.919 6.383 0.748 0.251 
23) Guinea 0.000 0.000 14.189 7.659 na na 
24) Guinea-Bissau 1.000 0.000 7.979 13.314 0.349 0.650 
25) Kenya 0.000 1.750 36.319 4.472 0.869 0.107 
26) Lesotho 0.000 0.000 29.358 4.382 0.868 0.131 
27)Liberia 0.280 0.000 20.892 7.293 0.715 0.284 
28) Libya na na 21.759 4.008 na na 
29) Madagascar 0.162 0.000 15.217 5.971 0.718 0.281 
30) Malawi 0.000 0.000 15.570 3.325 0.716 0.159 
31) Mali 2.812 0.000 18.272 9.166 0.667 0.332 
32) Mauritania 0.187 0.000 19.275 6.463 na na 
33) Mauritius  27.866 0.000 88.152 9.711 0.907 0.092 
34) Morocco 1.200 4.812 77.168 18.347 0.807 0.192 
35) Mozambique 1.637 0.000 26.547 4.339 0.857 0.14 
36) Namibia 0.000 50.362 44.530 0.911 0.975 0.024 
37) Niger 0.825 0.000 9.428 6.802 0.579 0.420 
38) Nigeria 0.025 0.000 22.728 3.517 0.849 0.150 
39) Rwanda 0.425 0.275 13.300 0.761 na na 
40) Sao Tome & Principe 0.000 0.000 28.957 4.998 0.851 0.148 
41) Senegal 3.787 0.000 26.308 8.552 0.753 0.246 
42) Seychelles 0.000 0.000 64.038 8.113 0.900 0.099 
43) Sierra Leone 0.000 0.000 15.716 3.822 na na 
44) Somalia na na na 0.000 na na 
45) South Africa 0.000 57.312 57.972 -15.475 1.363 -0.363 
46) Sudan 0.000 0.000 11.217 4.503 na na 
47) Swaziland 0.000 40.216 22.444 1.376 0.940 0.059 
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48) Tanzania 0.000 0.000 21.909 4.065 0.841 0.151 
49) Togo 2.550 0.000 26.491 8.881 0.750 0.249 
50) Tunisia 15.975 0.000 46.424 9.636 0.803 0.167 
51) Uganda 0.000 0.512 14.319 3.943 0.782 0.217 
52)Zambia 0.000 0.975 15.414 1.760 na na 
53) Zimbabwe 0.000 0.000 17.770 0.689 na na 
       
PCR: Public Credit Registries. PCB: Private Credit Bureaus.  Prop.1: Formal Financial Sector Development. Prop.3: Informal 
Financial Sector Development. Prop.5: Financial Sector Formalization. Prop.7: Financial Sector Informalization. na: not 
applicable because of missing observations.   
 
 
Appendix 2: Variable Definitions 
Variables  Signs Variable Definitions Sources 
Formal Financial 
Development  
Prop.1 Bank deposits/GDP. Bank deposits here refer to demand, time 
and saving deposits in deposit money banks (Lines 24 and 25 
of International Financial Statistics (IFS); October 2008).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Asongu (2014a; 
2015ab) 
   
Semi-formal  financial 
development 
Prop.2   (Financial deposits – Bank deposits)/ GDP.    Financial 
deposits are demand, time and saving deposits in deposit 
money banks and other financial institutions. (Lines 24, 25 
and 45 of IFS, October, 2008). 
   
Informal  financial 
development 
Prop.3 (Money Supply – Financial deposits)/GDP 
   
Informal and semi-formal 
financial development  
Prop.4 (Money  Supply –  Bank deposits)/GDP 
   
Financial intermediary 
formalization 
Prop.5 Bank deposits/ Money Supply (M2). From ‘informal and 
semi-formal’ to formal financial development (formalization) 
   
Financial intermediary 
‘semi-formalization’ 
Prop.6 (Financial deposits - Bank deposits)/ Money Supply. From 
‘informal and formal’ to semi-formal financial development 
(Semi-formalization) 
   
Financial intermediary 
‘informalization’ 
Prop.7 (Money Supply – Financial deposits)/ Money Supply. From 
‘formal and semi-formal’ to informal financial development 
(Informalisation). 
   
Financial intermediary 
‘semi-formalization and 
informalization’ 
Prop.8 (Money Supply – Bank Deposits)/Money Supply.  Formal to 
‘informal and semi-formal’ financial development: (Semi-
formalization and informalization) 
    
Information Asymmetry  PCR Public credit registry coverage (% of adults) World Bank (WDI) 
   
PCB Private credit bureau coverage (% of adults) World Bank (WDI) 
    
    
Economic Prosperity  GDPg GDP Growth (annual %) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Inflation  Infl Consumer Price Index (annual %) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Public Investment   PubIvt Gross Public Investment (% of GDP)  World Bank (WDI) 
    
Development Assistance    NODA Total Net Official Development Assistance (% of GDP)  World Bank (WDI) 
    
Trade openness  Trade Imports plus Exports in commodities (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
WDI: World Bank Development Indicators.  FDSD: Financial Development and Structure Database.  
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Appendix 3: Summary Statistics (2004-2011) 
  
 Variables Mean S.D Min. Max. Obs. 
       
 
 
 
Financial 
Sector 
Development  
Formal Financial Development (Prop.1) 28.037 20.970 2.926 92.325 377 
Semi-formal Financial Development (Prop. 2) 0.199 0.715 0.000 4.478 424 
Informal Financial Development (Prop. 3) 5.350 5.106 -18.89 25.674 424 
Non-formal Financial Development (Prop. 4) 5.550 5.171 -18.89 25.674 424 
Financial Formalization (Prop. 5) 0.773 0.168 0.235 1.469 377 
Financial Semi-formalization (Prop. 6) 0.007 0.029 0.000 0.244 377 
Financial Informalization (Prop. 7) 0.219 0.168 -0.469 0.764 377 
Financia Non-formalization (Prop. 8) 0.226 0.168 -0.469 0.764 377 
       
Information 
Asymmetry   
Public Credit registries (PCR) 2.155 5.812 0.000 49.8 381 
Private Credit Bureaus (PCB) 4.223 13.734 0.000 64.8 380 
       
 
Control 
Variables 
Economic Prosperity (GDPg) 4.996 4.556 -17.66 37.998 404 
Inflation 7.801 4.720   0 43.011 357 
Public Investment 74.778 1241.70 -8.974 24411 387 
Development Assistance  10.396 12.958 0.027 147.05 411 
Trade Openness (Trade) 80.861 32.935 24.968 186.15 392 
       
S.D: Standard Deviation.  Min: Minimum. Max: Maximum. GDPg: GDP growth. Obs: Observations.  
 29 
 
 
Appendix 4: Correlation Analysis (Uniform sample size : 293) 
            
Financial Sector Competition Info. Asymmetry Control Variables  
Prop.1 Prop.2 Prop.3 Prop.4 Prop.5 Prop.6 Prop.7 Prop.8 PCR PCB GDPg Inflation PubIvt NODA Trade  
1.000 0.110 0.127 0.142 0.565 -0.052 -0.556 -0.565 0.411 0.310 -0.094 -0.071 0.058 -0.311 0.141 Prop.1 
 1.000 -0.013 0.130 -0.031 0.872 -0.128 0.031 -0.023 -0.100 -0.060 0.260 -0.040 0.007 -0.086 Prop.2 
  1.000 0.989 -0.604 -0.068 0.617 0.604 0.127 -0.569 -0.083 -0.082 -0.054 0.033 -0.006 Prop.3 
   1.000 -0.604 0.057 0.593 0.604 0.123 -0.579 -0.091 -0.044 -0.059 0.034 -0.018 Prop.4 
    1.000 -0.092 -0.983 -1.000 0.094 0.613 -0.004 0.008 0.128 -0.246 0.119 Prop.5 
     1.000 -0.091 0.092 -0.059 -0.084 -0.077 0.289 -0.012 0.123 -0.074 Prop.6 
      1.000 0.983 -0.083 -0.598 0.018 -0.061 -0.125 0.224 -0.105 Prop.7 
       1.000 -0.094 -0.613 0.004 -0.008 -0.128 0.246 -0.119 Prop.8 
        1.000 -0.140 -0.026 -0.081 0.068 -0.154 0.207 PCR 
         1.000 -0.101 -0.035 -0.047 -0.329 0.084 PCB 
          1.000 -0.169 0.129 0.122 0.037 GDPg 
           1.000 -0.081 -0.0004 -0.006 Inflation  
            1.000 0.059 0.130 PubIvt 
             1.000 -0.309 NODA 
              1.000 Trade 
                
Info: Information. Prop.1: Formal Financial Sector Development. Prop.2: Semi-Formal Financial Sector Development. Prop.3: Informal Financial Sector Development. Prop. 4: Non-Formal Financial 
Development. Prop.5: Financial Sector Formalization. Prop.6: Financial Sector Semi-Formalization. Prop.7: Financial Sector Informalization. Prop.8: Financial Sector Non-Formalization. PCR: Public 
Credit Registries. PCB: Private Credit Bureaus. GDPg: GDP growth. Popg: Population growth. PubIvt: Public Investment. NODA: Net Official Development Assistance. I  
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Appendix 5: Persistence of the dependent variables  
         
 Prop.1 Prop.2 Prop.3 Prop.4 Prop.5 Prop.6 Prop.7 Prop.8 
Prop.1(-1) 0.9900        
Prop.2(-1)  0.8801       
Prop.3(-1)   0.9096      
Prop.4(-1)    0.9105     
Prop.5 (-1)     0.9841    
Prop.6(-1)      0.8775   
Prop.7(-1)       0.9855  
Prop.8(-1)        0.9841 
         
Prop.1 (-1): Lagged value of Proposition.  
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